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STAGGERED BOARDS AND ANNUAL MEETINGS:
CLOSING A LOOPHOLE IN THE STAGGERED
BOARD DEFENSE
D. Keith Clouser*
INTRODUCTION
In the context of a hostile takeover, the Board of Directors (“Board”)
of the target corporation has significant power to protect its charge.
Among the available defenses against hostile takeover is the statutory
power to establish a classified or staggered board. This particular defense,
however, has come under assault recently in the attempted takeover of
Airgas, Inc. (“Airgas”). In the takeover battle between Air Products and
Chemicals, Inc. (“Air Products”) and Airgas, both sides fought zealously,
Air Products seeking to acquire Airgas, and Airgas seeking to remain
independent.1 Air Products, in an unprecedented move, attempted to
circumvent Airgas’s staggered board2 by advancing the date of the Airgas
shareholder annual meeting by approximately eight months via bylaw
amendment. To rebuff Air Products’ advances, Airgas brought suit to
declare the shareholder approved amendment to Airgas’s bylaws invalid
under Airgas’s charter and under Delaware law.
The Air Products takeover attempt raises interesting and important
questions about the future of Delaware corporate takeover battles.
Particularly in light of the recent decision in the Court of Chancery
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2012; Bachelor of
Music, University of Delaware, 2005. Special thanks to Professor Michael Wachter for his
guidance and suggestions.
1. Or at the very least, obtain a higher price.
2. Corporations can employ staggered or classified (these terms are used
interchangeably) boards pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2010). The staggered
board provision of the Delaware code provides that “[t]he directors of any corporation . . .
may . . . be divided into 1, 2 or 3 classes. . . .” Id. Each class of directors’ terms expire at
the annual meeting in the first, second or third year following their election.
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rejecting Air Products’ demand that Airgas redeem its poison pill, the
ability for bidders to wage proxy contests becomes increasingly critical.3
As such, the decisions of the Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme
Court regarding Air Products’ proposed bylaw amendments have broad
implications.
This comment reviews the Court of Chancery4 and Delaware Supreme
Court5 opinions, and considers the potential impact of each. First, this
comment contends that the Delaware Supreme Court, although giving lip
service to the principles of favoring the shareholder franchise, impinges on
the shareholders’ right to amend corporate bylaws, while protecting the
Board’s right to do the same. Both the Court of Chancery and the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the Airgas charter was ambiguous, and
thus required contract interpretation to resolve. This comment argues that
Airgas’s charter was not ambiguous, and could be interpreted by its plain
language. Even assuming an ambiguity existed, however, this comment
argues that the Delaware Supreme Court’s interpretation, in contrast to the
Court of Chancery’s interpretation, did not properly apply the principle of
favoring the shareholder franchise in interpreting Airgas’s charter and
bylaws.
Second, this comment argues that the actions taken by Airgas’s Board
should have triggered heightened review by the courts, because the conduct
of the Board blatantly interfered with the shareholder franchise. Absent an
alternative requirement in a corporate charter or bylaws, the Delaware
General Corporate Law provides that “[i]n all matters other than the
election of directors, the affirmative vote of the majority of shares present
in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the
subject matter shall be the act of the stockholders . . . .”6
Here, the Airgas Board amended the corporate bylaws to move the
2010 annual meeting back from August 2010 until September 2010.
However, when the Airgas shareholders voted to move the 2011 annual
meeting, the Airgas Board brought suit to invalidate the shareholder action.
The Airgas Board’s conduct suggests that their underlying motive for
3. Airgas employed a poison pill triggered at 15% share ownership, and has
steadfastly refused to redeem the pill. Absent a redemption of the pill by Airgas’s Board, no
shareholder can acquire more than 14.99% of the company. Therefore, Air Products’ only
avenue for pursuing its takeover attempts, and Airgas’s shareholders’ only avenue for
supporting such a takeover, is through a proxy context.
4. Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. (Airgas I), No. 5817-CC, 2010 WL
3960599, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 2010) (holding that Air Products’ proposed bylaw is valid
under Airgas’s Charter and Delaware law).
5. Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. (Airgas II), 8 A.3d 1182, 1185 (Del. 2010)
(reversing the Court of Chancery and holding that Air Products’ proposed bylaw is invalid
under Airgas’s charter).
6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(2) (2010).
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invalidating the proposed bylaw is entrenchment, or keeping themselves in
office. This is precisely the concern that instigated the Delaware courts to
establish the heightened review in Blasius.7
Finally, this comment considers the impact of the Court of Chancery
and more importantly the Delaware Supreme Court decisions on the future
of the takeover battle in Delaware. Particularly in light of the strength of
the staggered board mechanism in resisting takeovers, this comment
considers whether the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion created too much
protection for target companies. This comment also considers whether the
holding of the Delaware Supreme Court may prevent future changes to
Airgas’s annual shareholder meeting date, as well as any company that
takes advantage of a staggered board, imposing a significant limitation to
the ability of shareholders to exercise their voting power.
Section I of this comment introduces the key players, and sets the
stage of the hostile takeover battle between Air Products and Airgas.
Section II discusses the Delaware Court of Chancery opinion of October 8,
2010. Section III discusses the Delaware Supreme Court decision of
November 23, 2010, which reversed the Court of Chancery’s holding.
Section IV discusses the principles of contract interpretation in corporate
law, specifically considering the principle of interpretation of ambiguous
provisions of corporate charters and bylaws in favor of the shareholder
franchise. Section V discusses the Blasius standard of review, and argues
that the conduct of Airgas’s Board should have triggered this heightened
standard of review. Finally, Section VI discusses the potential impacts of
the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision on staggered Boards and annual
meetings, with specific focus on the efficacy of staggered Boards and the
ability of a company to change the date of the shareholder meeting.
I.

THE KEY PLAYERS AND THE TAKEOVER DANCE

Airgas, Inc. and Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. are large
corporations within the chemical industry.8 Airgas claims to be the “largest
distributor of industrial, medical, and specialty gases and related equipment
. . . to industrial and commercial markets” in the United States.9 Air
Products serves a worldwide market in atmospheric, process and specialty
gases, and related equipment.10
Both companies are major players in the diversified chemical industry.
Bloomberg.com data indicates that Airgas was the “biggest acquirer of
7. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
8. AIR PRODUCTS, http://www.airproducts.com (last visited Jan. 28, 2011); AIRGAS,
http://www.airgas.com (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
9. AIRGAS, supra note 8.
10. AIR PRODUCTS, supra note 8.
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industrial-gas companies in North America in the five years through [Feb.
4, 2010], accounting for . . . transactions valued at $805 million . . . .”11 In
2002, Airgas acquired Air Products’ U.S. packaged-gas business for $236
million.12 Air Products’ CEO John McGlade said in an interview that Air
Products sought to re-enter the U.S. packaged-gas business, a motivating
factor in its bid for Airgas.13 Further, according to Air Products, the
combined company “would generate annual savings of $250 million two
years after the deal is completed . . . .”14
According to Yahoo! Finance, as of early 2011, Airgas had a market
capitalization of approximately $5.62 billion, and Air Products had a
market capitalization of approximately $18.62 billion.15 A combination of
the two corporations would create “the largest industrial gas supplier in
North America” with annual sales of approximately $12.5 billion.16 Air
Products is a shareholder of Airgas, holding approximately two percent of
Airgas’s outstanding common stock.17
In October of 2009, Air Products expressed interest in acquiring
Airgas.18 Air Products’ CEO John McGlade met with Airgas’s CEO Peter
McCausland to discuss a potential transaction between the companies.19
Air Products offered $60.00 in Air Products stock per share of Airgas stock
for the purchase of Airgas.20 McCausland informed McGlade that it was
not a good time for Airgas to consider a sale of the company, but presented
the proposal to Airgas’s Board.21 Airgas’s Board rejected the bid as
“grossly undervalu[ing]” the company.22 In their arguments before the
Court of Chancery, Airgas claimed that, if left alone, the Airgas stock price
would “be worth north of $70 by [2012].”23
Air Products presented several offers to the Airgas Board, which were

11. Jack Kaskey and Zachary Mider, Air Products May Take $5.1 Billion Airgas Bid
Hostile (Update 4), BLOOMBERG (Feb. 5, 2010, 4:10PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps
/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aPoHDw2OZD.o.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Summary for Air Products Common Stock, YAHOO! FINANCE (last visited Jan. 28,
2011), http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=APD; Summary for Airgas Common Stock, YAHOO!
FINANCE (last visited Jan 30, 2011), http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=ARG.
16. Matt Wilkinson, Air Products To Swallow Airgas, ROYAL SOC’Y OF CHEMISTRY
(Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/News/2010/February/09021001.asp.
17. Air Prods. & Chems, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc. (Air Prods.), 16 A.3d 48, 61 (Del. Ch.
2011).
18. Airgas I, 2010 WL 3960599, at *2.
19. Air Prods., 16 A.3d at 55.
20. Wilkinson, supra note 16.
21. Air Prods., 16 A.3d at 64.
22. Wilkinson, supra note 16.
23. Air Prods., 16 A.3d at 61.
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refused as inadequate.24 Air Products attempted several times to privately
negotiate with Airgas’s Board to come to an agreement, but Airgas
rebuffed the attempts, stating that “[t]he [Airgas] Board is not interested in
pursuing [Air Products’] proposal and continues to believe there is no
reason to meet.”25
On February 4, 2010, Air Products took its offer public, sending a
public letter to the Airgas board detailing Air Products’ intention to offer
Airgas shareholders an all-cash offer of sixty dollars per share for all
outstanding shares of Airgas stock.26 Although the Airgas Board rejected
this latest offer, Air Products launched its tender offer on February 11,
2010.27 Because Airgas employed a poison pill, among other defenses, Air
Products’ tender offer included several conditions that required the Airgas
Board to allow the transaction to proceed.28 Air Products also announced
its intention to nominate directors to Airgas’s board at the next Airgas
annual meeting.29 Airgas’s stock price increased by forty percent after Air
Products announced its intentions.30
Airgas sought and received several “inadequacy opinions” from
investment bankers, and recommended that its shareholders not tender into
Air Products’ offer because the price was grossly inadequate based on these
opinions.31 On March 13, 2010, Airgas announced its nominees for
Airgas’s Board: John P. Clancey, Robert L. Lumpkins, and Ted B. Miller,
Jr.32 The platform upon which the nominees ran for election touted their
independence, qualifications, and willingness to “consider without any bias
[the Air Products] offer . . . .”33
In addition to the nominees, Air Products announced that it would
seek three amendments to the Airgas bylaws:
(1) Amend Airgas’s bylaws to require Airgas to hold its 2011
annual meeting and all subsequent annual shareholder meetings
in the month of January;
(2) Amend Airgas’ [sic] bylaws to limit the Airgas Board’s
ability to reseat directors not elected by Airgas shareholders at
24. Airgas I, 2010 WL 3960599, at *2.
25. Air Prods., 16 A.3d at 67.
26. Id. at 68.
27. Id.
28. For example, the tender offer was conditioned on the Airgas board redeeming its
poison pill, approving the deal under the Delaware anti-takeover statutes, and not otherwise
impeding the transaction by, for example, entering into an agreement or transaction with a
third-party buyer. Id. at 69–70.
29. Id. at 70.
30. Wilkinson, supra note 16.
31. Air Prods., 16 A.3d at 70.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 72.

CLOUSER_FINALIZED_SIX (DO NOT DELETE)

564

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

2/21/2012 7:36 PM

[Vol. 14:2

the annual meeting (excluding the CEO); and
(3) Repeal all bylaw amendments adopted by the Airgas Board
after April 7, 2010.34
Airgas and Air Products engaged in a very public debate regarding the
upcoming proxy contest.35 Airgas’s Board, as well as “all four leading
proxy advisory firms,” recommended that Airgas’s shareholders vote
against Air Products proposed amendments.36
According to the
Institutional Shareholder Services report, Air Products’ proposed bylaw
amendment would “cede[ ] significant control of the negotiation process to
the bidder,” as well as “significantly impair the defensive value of the
classified board, limiting the board’s ability to negotiate the highest offer
for shareholders.”37
In April 2010, the Airgas Board amended Airgas’s bylaws to provide
the board with the ability to push back the date of the annual meeting. 38
Prior to this amendment, Article II of Airgas’s bylaws required the annual
meeting to be held within five months of the end of Airgas’s fiscal year,
which is in March.39 The board amended the bylaws to set the annual
meeting “on such date as the Board of Directors shall fix.”40 Pursuant to
this newly adopted power, the Airgas Board moved the annual meeting to
September 15, 2010 (the deadline would have been August 2010 absent the
bylaw amendment), ostensibly to “‘provide information to stockholders’
before the annual meeting, as well as more time to ‘demonstrate
performance of the company.’”41
Airgas’s charter provides that its Board will be staggered, pursuant to
34. Id. at 72 (citing Air Products’ Definitive Proxy Statement for 2010 Annual Meeting
of Airgas Stockholders (July 29, 2010)). Each of these proposed bylaws would put Air
Products closer to its goal of acquiring a majority of the board. For example, changing the
date of the annual meeting would theoretically shorten the time between directorial elections
by several months, potentially allowing Air Products to obtain a majority of the board by
January 2011.
35. Both companies issued several press releases regarding Airgas’s 2010 Annual
Meeting and Air Products’ tender offer. Air Products Press Releases, AIR PRODUCTS,
http://www.airproducts.com/company/news-center.aspx (select “2010” and “Corporate”
from
the
drop-down
boxes).
Airgas
Press
Releases,
AIRGAS,
http://www.airgas.com/content/pressReleases.aspx?year=2010.
36. Press Release, Airgas, Inc., All Four Leading Proxy Advisory Firms Recommend
Voting Against APD’s January Meeting Proposal (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.airgas.com/
content/pressReleases.aspx?PressRelease_ID=1586&year=2010
(quoting
Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS) report from Sept. 8, 2010). ISS did, however, recommend that
Airgas shareholders elect Air Products’ board nominees. Id.
37. Id.
38. Air Prods., 16 A.3d at 73.
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing Airgas Amended and Restated Bylaws, amended through April 7, 2010,
at Art. II).
41. Id.
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Title 8, Section 141(d) of the Delaware Code.42 At the time of the 2010
annual meeting, Airgas’s board consisted of nine directors divided into
three equal classes, with one class of Airgas’s directors up for election each
year.43 Air Products’ nominees were elected in the September 2010 annual
meeting of Airgas’s shareholders.44 In addition, despite the vigorous
opposition and lobbying from Airgas, Air Products’ proposed bylaws
received fifty-one percent of the shares voted at the September 15, 2010
meeting.45
Following the September 2010 annual meeting, Airgas issued a press
release indicating its disappointment with the results, but also noting its
belief that the bylaw amendment changing the annual meeting date to
January was invalid under Delaware law and Airgas’s articles of
incorporation.46 Airgas’s Board brought suit in the Court of Chancery
claiming, among other things, that the amendment to Airgas’s bylaws
changing the date of the annual meeting was invalid.47
II.

THE COURT OF CHANCERY OPINION

The Court of Chancery engaged in a two-part analysis to determine
whether the bylaw proposed by Air Products was invalid.48 First, the Court
of Chancery considered whether the bylaw amendment was proper under
Airgas’s bylaws and charter.49 Second, the Court of Chancery, having
found that the bylaw was appropriately passed under Airgas’s charter,
considered whether the bylaw violated Delaware law.50
Airgas contended that a bylaw moving the date of the annual meeting
requires approval of a supermajority, or sixty-seven percent, and that such a
bylaw is inconsistent with Airgas’s bylaws and charter.51 The argument
follows that, because Air Products’ bylaw amendment proposal only
42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(d) (2010); Airgas I, 2010 WL 3960599, at *2.
43. Airgas I, 2010 WL 3960599, at *2.
44. Id.
45. Air Products’ proposed bylaws received 45.8% of shares entitled to vote, which
amounted to a majority (51%) of shares that actually voted. Id. at *3.
46. Press Release, Airgas, Inc., Airgas Announces Preliminary Results of Annual
Meeting of Stockholders (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.airgas.com/content/press
Releases.aspx?PressRelease_ID=1589&year=2010.
47. Airgas I, 2010 WL 3960599, at *1; see Press Release, Airgas, Inc., Airgas
Announces Preliminary Results of Annual Meeting of Stockholders (Sept. 15, 2010),
http://www.airgas.com/content/pressReleases.aspx?PressRelease_ID=1589&year=2010
(stating “Airgas intends to seek an expedited judicial determination on the validity of this
by-law.”).
48. Airgas I, 2010 WL 3960599, at *1.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at *4.
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received a bare majority, such amendment was not passed by the
shareholders. Airgas’s charter provides that the bylaws may be amended
by the board of directors or the shareholders.52 Any shareholder
amendment to the bylaws must be passed by a “majority vote of the shares
represented and entitled to vote at [the annual] meeting.”53
Airgas’s charter also provides that:
Notwithstanding the foregoing [provisions regarding shareholder
amendment] and anything contained in the certificate of
incorporation to the contrary, Article III of the By-Laws shall not
be altered, amended or repealed and no provision inconsistent
therewith shall be adopted without the affirmative vote of the
holders of at least 67% of the voting power of all the shares of
the Corporation entitled to vote generally in the election of
Directors . . . .54
Article III of Airgas’s bylaws provides the mechanism for the election
and terms of Airgas’s Board.55 Article III, Section 1 provides, in pertinent
part:
The Directors . . . shall be classified, with respect to the time for
which they severally hold office, into three classes, as nearly
equal in number as possible, one class to hold office initially for a
term expiring at the annual meeting of stockholders to be held in
1987, another class to hold office initially for a term expiring at
the annual meeting of stockholders to be held in 1988, and a third
class to hold office initially for a term expiring at the annual
meeting of stockholders to be held in 1989, with the members of
each class to hold office until their successors are elected and
qualified. At each annual meeting of stockholders, the successors
or the class of Directors whose term expires at the meeting shall
be elected to hold office for a term expiring at the annual meeting
of stockholders held in the third year following the year of their
election.56
The Court of Chancery determined that the proposed bylaw moving
the annual meeting from September 2011 to January 2011 was not
inconsistent with Article III of Airgas’s bylaws.57 The Court of Chancery
noted that corporate charters and bylaws are subject to contract law,
because they are contracts among the shareholders of a corporation.58 If a
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
1990)).

Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Airgas Cert. of Inc., Art. V, § 6.
Airgas I, 2010 WL 3960599, at *4.
Airgas Bylaws, Art. III, § 1.
Airgas I, 2010 WL 3960599, *5.
Id. at *4 (citing Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923 (Del.
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provision in a corporate charter or bylaws is ambiguous, or susceptible to
multiple interpretations, the court must resolve such ambiguity “in favor of
the stockholders’ electoral rights.”59
According to the Court of Chancery, Article III is susceptible to
multiple interpretations.60 The Court of Chancery resolved the ambiguity
in favor of the shareholder franchise, and held that the proposed bylaw was
not inconsistent with Article III of Airgas’s bylaws.61
The Court of Chancery next addressed whether the proposed bylaw
amendment was inconsistent with Airgas’s charter.62 Specifically, Airgas
contended that Article 5, Section 1 of its charter, which established the
staggered board, provided that the term of its directors is “approximately
three years.”63 Airgas relied heavily on extrinsic evidence indicating that
Airgas has always held its annual meetings eleven to thirteen months
apart.64 The Court of Chancery, noting that the terms “annual” and “year”
are not defined in Airgas’s charter, determined that the provision is
ambiguous.65 Again resolving the conflict in favor of the shareholder
franchise, the Court of Chancery held that the charter, which provides that
directorial terms end at the annual meeting in the third year following their
election, does not require approximately 1095 day terms.66
After determining that the proposed bylaw amendment was not
inconsistent with Airgas’s bylaws or charter, the Court of Chancery
addressed whether the amendment was nevertheless invalid under
Delaware law.67 Airgas pointed to two provisions of the Delaware General
Corporate Law to support their argument that the bylaw violated Delaware
law.68 Specifically, Airgas contended that (1) the bylaw effected a

59. Id.; see also Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 310 (Del. Ch.
2002):
When a corporate charter is alleged to contain a restriction on the fundamental
electoral rights of stockholders . . . it has been said that the restriction must be
‘clear and unambiguous’ to be enforceable. The policy basis for this rule of
construction rests in the ‘belief that the shareholder franchise is the ideological
underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.
60. Airgas I, 2010 WL 3960599, at *5.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *6.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at *7. The Court of Chancery relies on the contract interpretation doctrine of
giving meaning to each provision. Because the bylaws provide the date of the annual
meeting, interpreting the charter to require that annual meeting to occur approximately a
year after the previous meeting would make the bylaw provision establishing the date of the
annual meeting superfluous. Id.
67. Id. at *8.
68. Id.
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“removal” under 8 Del. C. 141(k), and (2) the bylaw was invalid under 8
Del. C. 141(d).69
The Court of Chancery first addressed Airgas’s argument regarding
“removal.”70 Delaware Code title 8, section 141(k) provides that “[a]ny
director or the entire board of directors may be removed, with or without
cause, by the holders of a majority of the shares then entitled to vote at an
election of directors, except . . . in the case of a corporation whose board is
classified [under 8 Del. C. 141(d)].”71 In the case of classified boards,
shareholders may only remove directors “for cause.”72
The Court of Chancery noted that, in order to constitute a “removal”
under the statute, the directors must be removed from office prior to the
expiration of their “full term” on the board.73 Pursuant to Airgas’s charter
and bylaws, however, the Court of Chancery held that the “full term”
expires at the “annual meeting” of the shareholders, and therefore the
bylaw does not constitute a removal.74 Essentially, the directors’ terms end
at the annual meeting, whenever that happens to be. In order to be a
“removal,” the directors must be removed between annual meetings.
The Court of Chancery next addressed whether 8 Del. C. 211, which
provides the statutory framework for annual shareholder meetings, bars a
bylaw amendment to the date of the annual meeting.75 Section 211
provides that “an annual meeting of stockholders shall be held for the
election of directors on a date and at a time designated by or in the manner
provided by the bylaws.”76 Section 211 also provides that annual meetings
shall not be held more than thirteen months apart.77
The Court of Chancery held that nothing in Section 211 prevented
moving the 2011 annual meeting earlier in the year.78 The requirement of
no more than thirteen months elapsed time between meetings was enacted
to protect corporate democracy, and did not provide an alternate “minimum

69. Id.
70. Id. at *9.
71. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(2001).
72. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(1)(2010).
73. Airgas I, 2010 WL 3960599, at *9.
74. Id. (citing Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 401 (Del. 2010)).
The Court of Chancery considered and discarded the argument that the proposed bylaw
amendment “evad[es] the 67% removal requirement” in Airgas’s charter, applying the
doctrine of independent legal significance. The doctrine provides that an action taken
validly under one part of the statute is legally independent from other sections, even if the
same result could be effected under another provision of the statute. Id. at *5 (citing Orzeck
v. Englehart, 195 A.2d 375, 377 (Del. 1963)).
75. Id. at *10.
76. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2010).
77. Id.
78. Airgas I, 2010 WL 3960599, at *10.
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elapsed time” between meetings.79 Although the Court of Chancery noted
certain logistical reasons that two meetings must be separated by a
minimum time, none of these reasons prevented a four-month gap between
meetings.80
The Court of Chancery concluded that the proposed bylaw amendment
was valid under both the Airgas charter and Delaware law.81
III. THE DELAWARE SUPREME COURT OPINION
After the Court of Chancery issued its final order declaring the
proposed bylaw amendment to be valid under the Airgas charter and
Delaware law, Airgas appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court.82 The
Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery decision, finding
that the proposed bylaw amendment was inconsistent with Airgas’s charter
and constituted a de facto removal of Airgas’s directors.83
To arrive at its decision, the Delaware Supreme Court distinguished
between Defined Term Alternative and Annual Meeting Term Alternative
forms for staggered boards.84 The court noted that, in the Defined Term
Alternative (with language tracking 8 Del. C. 141(d)), corporate charters
explicitly provided for three-year terms for directors.85 Consequently, in
the Annual Meeting Term Alternative (using language substantially similar
to the Airgas charter), corporate charters provided that the directorial terms
ended at the annual meeting in the third year following their election.86
The Delaware Supreme Court engaged in a lengthy analysis of case
law, statutory commentary, and extrinsic evidence of corporate practice to
find that the Annual Meeting Term Alternative and the Defined Term
Alternative are indistinguishable in that both provide for three-year
79. Id.
80. See id. (noting that notice and filing requirements may prevent two meetings from
being back to back, but these logistical issues would not prevent a meeting four months
later).
81. Id. at *14.
82. Press Release, Airgas, Inc., Airgas to Appeal Delaware Chancery Court Ruling
(Oct. 11, 2010), http://www.airgas.com/content/pressReleases.aspx?PressRelease_ID
=1598&year=2010.
83. Airgas II, 8 A.3d at 1194–95.
84. Id. at 1188. The “Defined Term Alternative” and “Annual Meeting Term
Alternative” are defined in the Delaware Supreme Court opinion, and indicate that there are
distinct forms of classified board provisions, which provide for distinct term lengths.
85. Id.
86. Id. The distinction between the Defined Term Alternative and the Annual Meeting
Term Alternative is the possible length of the directorial terms. The plain language of the
Defined Term Alternative indicates that directors serve for three years. The plain language
of the Annual Meeting Term Alternative indicates that directors serve until the third annual
meeting (which could be as little as two years and one month, or as much as three years and
three months).
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directorial terms.87 The court found that the Airgas charter is ambiguous,
and held that uncontroverted extrinsic evidence indicates that the intended
meaning of the Annual Meeting Term Alternative is three-year directorial
terms.88
The Delaware Supreme Court began its analysis with case law.89
Although the court conceded that it had not yet been called upon to
interpret the Annual Meeting Term Alternative, the court cited language
from several cases that suggest that directors on staggered boards serve
three-year terms.90 However, because this is a question of first impression,
the language cited by the Delaware Supreme Court merely reflects that
Delaware courts have not had cause to note a distinction between the
Defined Term Alternative and the Annual Meeting Term Alternative
language.91
The Delaware Supreme Court next considered industry practice with
respect to staggered boards.92 According to the court, fifty-eight of the
eighty-nine Fortune 500 Delaware corporations employ the Annual
Meeting Term Alternative.93 Of those corporations, forty-six expressly
state in their proxy statements that their directors serve three-year terms.94
This suggests that these corporations intended that their staggered board
provisions, which used the Annual Meeting Term Alternative language,
87. See id. at 1194 (holding that Defined Term Alternative language and Annual
Meeting Term Alternative language are equivalent).
88. Id. at 1189–90. The Delaware Supreme Court considered the ABA’s Public
Company Organizational Documents: Model Forms and Commentary, as well as proxy
statements of corporations that employ the Annual Meeting Term Alternative, to arrive at its
decision that there is no functional difference between the Annual Meeting Term Alternative
and the Defined Term Alternative. Id. At 1191–92 (citing A.B.A. PUBLIC COMPANY
ORGANIZATIONAL DOCUMENTS: MODEL FORMS AND COMMENTARY (2009)).
89. Id. at 1190.
90. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court cited dicta from several cases, which, according
to the Court, “reflects the understanding of the [Delaware courts] that directors of staggered
boards serve a three year term.” Id. For example, the Delaware Supreme Court cites
Versata Enters. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 604 (Del. 2010), for the proposition that “[a]
classified board would delay-but not prevent-a hostile acquirer from obtaining control of
the board, since a determined acquirer could wage a proxy contest and obtain control of two
thirds of the target board over a two year period, as opposed to seizing control in a single
election.” Id. at n. 18 (quoting Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1186 n. 17 (Del.
Ch. 1998)). However, Versata held that a 4.99% poison pill was not preclusive, so the
statement about the length of time to acquire control of the board is unnecessary to the
holding, and reflects a “worst case scenario” for a bidder to acquire control of the board.
Versata Enters., 5 A.3d at 604.
91. See, e.g., Dolgoff v. Projectavision, Inc., No. Civ.A. 14805, 1996 WL 91945, at *9
(Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 1996) (“It ordinarily requires two years for an opponent to possibly
secure a majority of the seats on a staggered board.”) (emphasis added).
92. Airgas II, 8 A.3d at 1191.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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provided for precisely three-year terms. Further, of the corporations that
have “de-staggered” their Annual Meeting Term Alternative staggered
boards, 97% represented in their proxy statements that their directors
served three-year terms.95
The Delaware Supreme Court also found commentary on the
Delaware General Corporate Law and the Model Forms persuasive.96 The
commentary to 8 Del. C. 141(d) states that “directors elected to succeed
those whose terms expire shall be elected for a three-year term.”97
The Delaware Supreme Court, disagreeing with the Court of
Chancery, found that although the wording of the staggered board
provision in Airgas’s charter differs from provisions that mandated threeyear terms, Airgas’s charter nonetheless provides that Airgas’s directors
were entitled to a full term of three years.98 The court hedged its decision
by saying that there need not be mathematical exactitude in measuring the
duration of the director’s terms, but only that two years and four months
was too short.99
Ultimately, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the proposed bylaw
amendment seeking to move the annual meeting date was invalid under the
Airgas charter.100 The proposed bylaw amendment was invalid, according
to the court, because it “impermissibly shorten[ed] the directors’ three year
staggered terms as provided by Article 5, Section 1 of the Airgas
Charter,”101 and constituted a de facto removal of directors without the
required sixty-seven percent shareholder approval under Article 5, Section
3.102
IV. FINDING AMBIGUITY AND CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
A corporation’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws are interpreted
by courts applying the standards of contract interpretation.103 The first
question a court must answer is whether the plain meaning of a provision
lends itself to multiple interpretations.104 If there is no ambiguity, then the

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. A.B.A., PUBLIC COMPANY ORGANIZATIONAL DOCUMENTS: MODEL FORMS AND
COMMENTARY 67 (2009).
98. Airgas II, 8 A.3d at 1194.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1195.
101. Id. at 1194–95.
102. Id. Interestingly, the de facto removal argument fails to consider the possibility that
the board members could be reelected by the shareholders at the January 2011 meeting.
103. KFC Nat’l Council and Adver. Coop., Inc. v. KFC Corp., C.A. No. 5191-VCS,
2011 WL 350415, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31 2011).
104. Id.
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court must interpret the contract in accordance with the plain meaning of
the language.105
To determine if there is ambiguity in or among corporate articles of
incorporation and bylaws, courts should look only to the contractual
language.106 Courts must not look at extrinsic evidence to create an
ambiguity.107 Further, where possible, contracts should be interpreted to
“give effect to every term and not render any terms meaningless or
superfluous.”108
Both the Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court, in
arriving at their decisions, make it clear that the analysis hinges on contract
interpretation.109 Both courts also note that, in interpreting an unclear or
ambiguous charter or bylaw, any doubt is resolved “in favor of the
stockholders’ electoral rights.”110 As the Court of Chancery noted, the term
annual meeting should mean the same thing for companies with staggered
boards and those without.111 Shareholders have the right under Delaware
law to amend the bylaws by a majority shareholder vote, and in
corporations without staggered boards, shareholders have the flexibility to
move the annual meeting to any time during the year, so long as it does not
conflict with the statutory requirements.112 It follows that, where the Board
and the Shareholders disagree on the meaning of an ambiguous provision
regarding the date of the annual meeting, the court should interpret the
provision in a manner that favors shareholder democracy, rather than Board
power. However, only the Court of Chancery applied these principles in its
opinion.113
As the opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court demonstrates,
although perhaps unintentionally,114 the language of Airgas’s charter does
105. Id.
106. O’Brien v. Progressive Nat’l Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 289 (Del. 2001) (“Delaware
courts are obligated to confine themselves to the language of the document and not to look
to extrinsic evidence to find ambiguity.”).
107. Id.
108. KFC Nat’l Council and Adver. Coop., 2011 WL 350415, at *11.
109. Airgas I, 2010 WL 3960599, at *3 (“Corporate charters and by-laws are contracts
among the shareholders of a corporation and the general rules of contract interpretation are
held to apply.”); Airgas II, 8 A.3d at 1188 (“Corporate charters and bylaws are contracts
among a corporation’s shareholders; therefore, our rules of contract interpretation apply.”).
110. Airgas II, 8 A.3d at 1188.
111. Airgas I, 2010 WL 3960599, at *12.
112. Specifically, the separation between annual meetings cannot be less than thirty
days, or greater than thirteen months. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2010); see Airgas I,
2010 WL 3960599, at *12 (citing Shintom Co. v. Audiovox Corp., 888 A.2d 225, 227 (Del.
2005)).
113. Airgas I, 2010 WL 3960599, at *7 (stating that “. . . [in] construing the ambiguous
terms of the charter in favor of the shareholder franchise, ‘annual’ in this context must mean
occurring once a year”).
114. The Delaware Supreme Court expended much verbiage in describing the distinction
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not mandate a finding of ambiguity.115 The Delaware Supreme Court notes
that there are two incarnations of the staggered board mechanism, the
Defined Term Alternative and the Annual Meeting Term Alternative.116
Each alternative has explicit language indicating the length of directorial
terms; the Defined Term Alternative expressly indicates a three-year term
and the Annual Meeting Term Alternative expressly indicates a term
ending at the annual meeting occurring in the third year following
election.117 Therefore, no finding of ambiguity is necessary.
The Delaware Supreme Court gives great weight to the
“uncontroverted extrinsic evidence bearing on the intended meaning of the
Airgas Charter”118 in arriving at its decision that, notwithstanding Airgas’s
use of the Annual Meeting Term Alternative language, Airgas intended to
have three-year directorial terms.119 However, the Delaware Supreme
Court does not consider the effect of its decision on the shareholders’
electoral rights. The court’s ultimate holding is that both the Annual
Meeting Term Alternative and the Defined Term Alternative mean
precisely the same thing—each provides three-year directorial terms.120
At the time Airgas established its charter and began holding annual
meetings in 1986, both the Annual Meeting Term Alternative and the
Defined Term Alternative Language existed.121 The Court of Chancery and
the Delaware Supreme Court appear to consider the presence of the two
alternatives as creating an ambiguity, which requires analysis into extrinsic
evidence and the intent of the parties. However, the fact that two sets of
alternative language exist suggests that, at the time Airgas established its
charter, it considered (or at least could have considered) both options, and
the plain meaning that each option inheres, and selected the Annual
Meeting Term Alternative.
As the Court of Chancery stated, if Airgas had desired that its
between the Defined Term Alternative and the Annual Meeting Term Alternative, and what
the plain language of each provides, only to then find ambiguity in the Annual Meeting
Term Alternative. Airgas II, 8 A.3d at 1188–90.
115. See Airgas II, 8 A.3d at 1188 (defining the staggered board mechanisms as the
Defined Term Alternative and the Annual Meeting Term Alternative).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1189.
119. Id. at 1194.
120. Id. at 1194. The alternative to this holding is that each provides a different
benchmark to measure directorial terms: Defined Term Alternative uses an approximately
36 month benchmark, whereas Annual Meeting Alternative uses three annual meetings to
define the length of directorial terms.
121. See, e.g., Roven v. Cotter, 547 A.2d 603, 604 (Del. Ch. 1988) (discussing the
Annual Meeting Term Alternative language); Essential Enters Corp. v. Automatic Steel
Prods., Inc., 159 A.2d 288, 290 (Del. Ch. 1960) (discussing the Defined Term Alternative
language).
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directors would serve three-year terms, the language was readily available
to mandate this result.122 Airgas opted to select language that tied the
expiration of directorial terms to the date of the annual meeting. It is
unlikely that, by establishing the staggered board, Airgas intended to
permanently set the date of its annual meeting. Nevertheless, this is the
precise result of the opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court. Although the
court qualified its holding by stating that “[n]o party to this case has argued
that DGCL Section 141(d) or the Airgas Charter requires that the three year
terms be measured with mathematical precision[,]” the holding of the court
essentially ties Airgas’s Board and shareholders to holding their annual
meetings at approximately the same time every year, until such time as the
charter is amended to remove the staggered board mechanism.123
Airgas also chose to include a provision in its charter that provided for
the manner of setting the date of the annual meeting. Article II, Section 1
of the Airgas charter governs annual meetings of the shareholders,
including setting the date for such meeting.124 Under normal operation of
the Airgas charter, Article II is not subject to the special sixty-seven
percent requirements for amendment.125 However, under the Delaware
Supreme Court’s holding, the date of the annual shareholder meeting was
permanently fixed by the establishment of the staggered board, because any
attempt to change the date (absent amending the charter to either “destagger” the board or to create a charter provision setting the date of the
shareholder meeting) would conflict with Airgas’s charter. Any bylaw
provision that conflicts with the charter is void under Delaware law.126
More importantly, just prior to the approval of Air Products’ proposed
bylaw, which moved the date of the annual meeting, the Airgas Board
amended Airgas’s bylaws to allow the board to change the date of the
annual meeting to such time “as the Board of Directors shall fix.”127
Following this bylaw amendment by the Airgas Board, the board moved
Airgas’s 2010 Annual Meeting back to September 15, 2010.128 Under the
Delaware Supreme Court’s holding, this would have been an invalid action
because it extended the staggered board term beyond the three year mark to
more than thirty-seven months.129
122. Airgas ), 2010 WL 3960599, at *7.
123. Airgas II, 8 A.3d at 1194.
124. Airgas I, 2010 WL 3960599, at *5.
125. See id. (noting that amendments that are inconsistent with article III are subject to
the required sixty-seven percent shareholder approval).
126. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2010).
127. Airgas Amended and Restated Bylaws (amended through April 7, 2010) at Art. II.
128. Such action would have been inconsistent with the pre-amendment Airgas Bylaws,
because prior to the amendment, Airgas’s Bylaws required the Annual Meeting to be held
within five months after the end of Airgas’s fiscal year in March. Air Prods., 16 A.3d at 73.
129. See Airgas II, 8 A.3d at 1186 n.2 (listing the dates of the historical annual meetings,
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Notwithstanding the fact that the Annual Meeting Term Alternative
language is not necessarily ambiguous on its face, in resolving the
supposed ambiguity, the Delaware Supreme Court did not adhere to the
principle of resolving ambiguity in corporate charters in favor of the
shareholder franchise.130 Although it stated that it was applying this
principle, the Delaware Supreme Court did not favor the shareholder
franchise in its analysis.131
The Delaware Supreme Court identified two interpretations for the
supposedly ambiguous provision, one that provided the shareholders with
flexibility to set the date of their annual meetings in the Bylaws by a
majority vote,132 and the other that requires a sixty-seven percent vote of
the shareholders to set the date of the annual meeting.133 The first option
clearly gives greater effect to the shareholder franchise, and would provide
parity between the power of the board and the shareholders to amend the
bylaws and set the date of the annual meeting.
The Airgas shareholders voted in favor of moving the annual meeting
date. The annual meeting is the primary mechanism through which the
shareholders can employ their electoral rights. However, the Delaware
Supreme Court interpreted the charter to require that, even though a
majority vote of the shareholders approved the change to the date of the
annual meeting, the shareholders were unable to effectuate such a
decision.134
When presented with two interpretations of the charter, the Delaware
Supreme Court selected the interpretation that effectively eviscerated the
shareholder franchise, rather than the (more than equally) plausible
interpretation that would give maximum effect to the shareholder franchise.
For example, had the court determined that the Annual Meeting Term
Alternative comported with its plain language, the shareholders would be
free to decide what time of year provided them the best opportunity to
employ their electoral rights. However, given the Delaware Supreme
Court’s holding, Airgas’s shareholders are bound by the date set in the
bylaws until they effectively “de-stagger” the Airgas Board, because any
change to the annual meeting date necessarily would be inconsistent with

which show that the Airgas 2007 Annual Meeting was held on August 7, 2007, and the
directors elected at that meeting served more than three years, because they were up for
election on September 15, 2010).
130. JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 338 (Del. Ch.
2008); Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 310 (Del. Ch. 2002).
131. See Airgas II, 8 A.3d at 1194–95 (resolving the ambiguity in favor of the Airgas
board of directors).
132. Airgas I, 2010 WL 3960599 at *5.
133. Id.
134. Airgas II, 8 A.3d at 1194.
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the Charter provision establishing the staggered board and thus invalid.135
V.

HEIGHTENED REVIEW AND CONCERNS OF ENTRENCHMENT

Beyond the question of interpretation of the Airgas charter, the Court
of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court should have considered the
concerns of board entrenchment and heightened review for board action.
The conduct of Airgas’s Board in responding to the efforts of Air Products
to acquire Airgas should have implicated the heightened review mandated
in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.136 Since the Court of Chancery’s
decision in Blasius, Delaware courts have considered the shareholder
franchise as the key to the hostile takeover. Delaware law does not prevent
hostile takeovers but essentially forces the bidder to employ its rights as a
shareholder
to
vote
out
the
existing
management.
By relying on the shareholder franchise as the only recourse for
interested bidders, Delaware law puts a great deal of pressure on the
shareholder franchise being uninhibited by the actions of the board of
directors. To protect the efficacy of the shareholder franchise, the
Delaware courts have established heightened standards of review for
corporate board actions taken in the context of a hostile takeover.
Specifically, where a corporate board of directors takes action that
interferes with the shareholder franchise, such action must have a
compelling justification.137
The Airgas Board brought a suit to invalidate a shareholder-approved
amendment to its bylaws.138 Applying the Blasius standard, in order for
this defensive action to be valid, the Airgas Board cannot be motivated by a
primary purpose of entrenchment.139 Here, the argument of the Airgas
Board explicitly demonstrates that their primary concern with the proposed
bylaw amendment is that it would effect a de facto removal of certain
directors.140
Where Airgas’s Board acts with a primary purpose of entrenchment, it
must have a compelling justification for such action.141 Here, the
justification implicitly presented by the Airgas Board is that Air Products’
proposed bylaw amendment would allow Airgas’s shareholders to elect
135. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2010).
136. 564 A.2d 651, 660 (Del. Ch. 1988).
137. Id. at 661.
138. Airgas I, 2010 WL 3960599, at *1.
139. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 658.
140. Airgas I, 2010 WL 3960599, at *1; see also Steel Partners II, L.P. v. Point Blank
Solutions, Inc., C.A. No. 3695-CC, 2008 WL 3522431, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 2008)
(considering a motion to postpone annual meeting and finding that postponing the annual
meeting impinges on the shareholder franchise).
141. Blasius, 564 A.2d 651.

CLOUSER_FINALIZED_SIX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

STAGGERED BOARDS AND ANNUAL MEETINGS

2/21/2012 7:36 PM

577

new board members sooner than anticipated. There is no suggestion that
this bylaw automatically inserts Air Products’ nominees onto the Airgas
board. To the contrary, all the amendment provides is the opportunity for
Airgas’s shareholders to exercise their electoral rights in January 2011, as
opposed to September 2011.
By bringing a suit to invalidate the proposed bylaw amendment,
Airgas’s Board acted for the primary purpose of interfering with the
shareholder franchise and entrenching themselves. Particularly after
amending the bylaws to provide the Airgas Board greater flexibility in
setting Airgas’s annual meetings, the Board’s efforts to eliminate similar
flexibility for the shareholders is telling.
Although the Delaware Supreme Court held that the delay of an
annual meeting for the purpose of providing shareholders with more
information does not mandate Blasius review in Mercier v. Inter-Tel,
Inc.,142 the circumstances here do not suggest a motive other than board
entrenchment. The assumption made by the Airgas Board is that the Airgas
shareholders will elect the wrong people to the board in January. The
implicit statement made by this conduct is that the Airgas shareholders are
ill-equipped to determine who should manage Airgas.
The Delaware Supreme Court provided a clear explanation of the
logic behind Blasius in MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.:143
Maintaining a proper balance in the allocation of power between
the stockholders’ right to elect directors and the board of
directors’ right to manage the corporation is dependent upon the
stockholders’ unimpeded right to vote effectively in an election
of directors. This Court has repeatedly stated that, if the
stockholders are not satisfied with the management or actions of
their elected representatives on the board of directors, the power
of corporate democracy is available to the stockholders to replace
the incumbent directors when they stand for re-election.
Consequently, two decades ago, this Court held: The Courts of
this State will not allow the wrongful subversion of corporate
democracy by manipulation of the corporate machinery or by
machinations under the cloak of Delaware law. Accordingly,
careful judicial scrutiny will be given a situation in which the
right to vote for the election of successor directors has been
effectively frustrated and denied.144
The Delaware Supreme Court in Mercier, interpreting the MM
Companies decision, noted that the Blasius approach “should be reserved
largely for director election contests or election contests having
142. 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007).
143. 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003).
144. Id. at 1127 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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consequences for corporate control.”145
In the battle between Air Products and Airgas, the date of the annual
meeting has significant “consequences for corporate control[,]” and
therefore brings to the fore the question of whether the conduct of the
Airgas Board indicates entrenchment motives.146 Although the Blasius
standard has not, apparently, been applied to the conduct of bringing suit to
invalidate shareholder bylaw amendments, this situation provides a
compelling set of facts under which to extend the Blasius protections for
the shareholder franchise. The Delaware Supreme Court, and the Court of
Chancery, should have considered whether the Airgas Board’s conduct met
the heightened review required by Blasius.
The “compelling justification” requirement for board action that risks
entrenchment is a difficult standard to meet.147 It is unlikely that the Airgas
Board could present any justification, let alone a compelling justification,
for attempting to invalidate its shareholders’ exercise of their voting rights
in approving Air Products’ proposed bylaw. Therefore, the Court of
Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court, had they considered Airgas’s
Board’s conduct under Blasius, would likely have found that Airgas’s
Board fell far short of appropriate conduct.
Even if the courts chose not to consider the Airgas Board’s conduct
under the stringent Blasius standard, the courts should have considered the
Airgas Board’s actions under the less stringent Unocal standard.148
Airgas’s Board likely could not meet even this burden. Under Unocal,
defensive measures must be proportionate to the threat perceived, and
cannot be coercive or preclusive.149 Here, the Airgas Board likely would
not have been able to establish a legitimate threat to corporate policy
warranting defensive action. Air Products’ nominees were elected to the
Airgas Board on September 15, 2010 and voted against the merger because
they believed the price was inadequate. Even if Air Products had acquired
three additional seats on the Airgas Board, giving them a majority, there is
no indication that the Air Products’ nominees would change their positions
on the merger. Therefore, the only apparent justification behind the
conduct of Airgas’s Board of Directors is that they objected to being
replaced.
The “omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its
own interests” creating an “enhanced duty” is not only present in this case
but also explicit.150 As such, the Delaware Supreme Court, and the Court
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Mercier, 929 A.2d at 809 (internal citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 805 (noting the “extremely heavy burden” under Blasius).
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
Id. at 949.
Id. at 954; see also Air Prods., 16 A.3d at 93.
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of Chancery, should at the very least have scrutinized Airgas’s Board’s
conduct under the Unocal standard of review. Had they engaged in such
scrutiny, the courts likely would not have found the actions of the Airgas
Board to be proportionate to the threat, because the only threat the
corporation faced was the threat of different Board membership, rather than
takeover.
VI. THE FUTURE OF THE STAGGERED BOARD
Staggered boards are a particularly effective defensive measure
against hostile takeover attempts.151 In light of the Delaware Supreme
Court’s decision in this case, a staggered board will at the very least
prevent a hostile bidder from acquiring a majority of the board of its target
for two years.152 The power inherent in this type of defense is felt two-fold:
the bidder must wage two successful proxy contests separated by a year,
and the bidder’s shareholders must endure a prolonged period of depressed
stock price while the bidder “negotiates” the merger.153
According to Lucian A. Bebchuk, an effective staggered board
provision provides corporations with a more powerful anti-takeover
defense than is typically recognized by the courts.154 Bebchuk opines that,
in light of empirical data, companies with staggered boards did not benefit,
in the form of higher premiums, from the presence of the staggered
board.155 Bebchuk suggests that, in the context of staggered boards,
incumbent directors that lose the first election of the staggered board after a
hostile takeover bid should no longer be allowed to continue to block the
bid with takeover defenses such as poison pills.156 At this point, the
argument goes, the board of directors is no longer managing the
corporation for the benefit of the shareholders.
Of primary importance to the present case is Bebchuk’s empirical
evidence and analysis of the ex post benefits to shareholders of a
corporation’s staggered board defense. According to Bebchuk, the ability
151. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered
Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L. REV. 885,
916–17 (2002) (finding that a staggered board increases the likelihood that a corporation
remains independent after a hostile takeover bid).
152. Air Prods., 16 A.3d at 115 (noting that the Delaware Supreme Court decision in
Airgas, Inc. v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. requires two years to overcome the
staggered board).
153. See id. (noting the legitimate reasons why Air Products may not wait eight months
to wage a second proxy contest).
154. Bebchuk, supra note 151, at 886.
155. Id. at 887.
156. Bebchuk engaged in a five-year study which indicated that defeating hostile bids
“not only does not profit shareholders in the ‘overwhelming majority’ of cases, but
commonly hurts them.” Id. at 890.
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of incumbent directors to resist hostile bids in such a fashion actually hurts,
on average, shareholders of the target corporations.157 This is an important
finding, because it suggests that when a corporation’s board of directors
pushes to maintain its staggered board after losing an election, it is doing so
at the expense of the shareholders.158
In the context of Airgas’s defensive strategy to Air Products’ hostile
takeover bid, Airgas has found itself on the losing end of a proxy contest.
Air Products ousted the first set of incumbent directors up for election in
September 2010, and is theoretically poised to oust the second set of
directors in 2011. At this point, applying the findings of Bebchuk’s
studies, the Airgas Board is no longer operating to provide Airgas’s
shareholders with the highest value, but instead is acting for entrenchment
purposes.
Not only does this potentially implicate Blasius concerns, as discussed
above, this also raises the question of whether the board is acting to acquire
the best possible price for the shareholders.159 Under Revlon, Inc. v.
McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,160 a corporation that acknowledges
that their company is for sale has the primary duty of obtaining the highest
value possible for the shareholders.161 The trigger for the Revlon duties has
been debated over the years, and it is an open question as to whether
Airgas’s Board’s conduct in negotiating with Air Products implicates such
duties.162 Although there has not been an explicit statement that Airgas is
“in play,” the conduct of the board of directors indicates that the only
reason for rejecting the Air Products hostile bid is that the price is
inadequate.163
The question of whether the holdings in the Airgas and Air Products
battle ultimately will hurt the Airgas shareholders can only be answered in
time. Although the Airgas stock price has fallen from the high of $71/share
during the October–November 2010 time period, it has hovered in the mid
to low $60s since mid–November 2010.164 It is possible that the Air
157. Id. at 889.
158. Id.
159. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986) (holding that once a company has put itself up for sale, its board of directors have a
duty to obtain the highest possible price).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. For example, according to testimony of McCausland, Airgas’s CEO, Airgas would
be willing to begin negotiations with Air Products upon receipt of a $70/share offer. Air
Prods., 16 A.3d at 81 n.202. Air Products did provide a $70/share offer in December 2010.
Id. at 86.
163. Indeed, price inadequacy is the only threat to corporate policy identified by the
Court of Chancery. Air. Prods., 16 A.3d at 57–58.
164. Summary for Airgas, Inc. Common Stock, YAHOO! FINANCE (last visited March 27,
2011), http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=ARG.
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Products bid was precisely the necessary catalyst to bring Airgas out of its
multi-year slump. However, as suggested by Bebchuk’s research, it is
likely that defeating Air Product’s hostile bid will not provide Airgas
shareholders with any additional value and may even hurt them.
In light of the research of Lucian A. Bebchuk, the conduct of the
Airgas Board in attempting to extend their control of the corporation via
the staggered board may actually disadvantage the Airgas shareholders.
Further, Airgas’s shareholders have already voted in favor of transferring
control, both by electing Air Products’ slate of directors in September 2010
and by approving the proposed bylaw amendment moving the annual
meeting.165 Although the Airgas Board apparently can continue to delay a
transaction, whether such delay is in the best interests of the shareholders is
questionable.
CONCLUSION
In the now well-known battle between Air Products and Airgas, Air
Products succeeded in electing three of its nominees to Airgas’s Board, as
well as obtaining a majority vote on a bylaw that would move the next
annual meeting of the shareholders up eight months, only to be rebuffed by
the courts. In an important decision under Delaware law, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that a staggered board requires three-year terms, even
where the enabling language of the Charter does not appear to so require.
The Delaware Supreme Court has abandoned the principles of contract
interpretation and has found that a bylaw that changes the date of the
shareholders’ annual meeting is invalid where a corporation has employed
a staggered board. This decision is contrary to the plain language of the
corporate charter enabling the staggered board, and fails to apply the
longstanding principle of interpreting charter provisions in favor of the
shareholder franchise.
Although it is arguable that moving the annual meeting is an end run
around the staggered board, it is clear in this case that the shareholders
were well aware of the import of their decisions and had made their desires
known. For example, the shareholders approved by majority vote moving
the annual meeting, notwithstanding the fact that Institutional Shareholder
Services strongly advised against it and stated that such a vote would

165. The shareholders approved moving the meeting notwithstanding Institutional
Shareholder Services’ advice to Airgas’s shareholders that “pulling the next annual meeting
ahead by 9 months would significantly impair the defensive value of the classified board,
limiting the board’s ability to negotiate the highest offer for shareholders.” Airgas I, 2010
WL 3960599, at *3 (quoting Press Release, Airgas, Inc., Two Leading Proxy Advisory
Firms Recommend Voting Against APD’s January Meeting Proposal (Sept. 9, 2010),
http://www.airgas.com/content/pressReleases.aspx?PressRelease_ID=1584&year=2010.
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significantly diminish the defensive value of the staggered board.166
Further, the Delaware Supreme Court did not consider whether the
actions by Airgas’s Board were taken primarily for the purpose of
entrenching themselves. The Delaware courts have consistently held that,
in the context of hostile takeovers, it is the risk of board entrenchment
motivations that implicates heightened review. Here, Air Products
successfully elected its three nominees to Airgas’s Board and obtained a
bylaw amendment that would allow another vote early the following year.
In response, the board of directors brought suit to invalidate the bylaw
amendments, thereby delaying the election of the second class of directors.
The effect of this ruling is to put out of reach a change in the date of
the annual meeting for corporations employing staggered boards. This
result impinges on the shareholder franchise, rather than enabling it. Thus,
the ruling fails to give effect to the important principle of protecting the
shareholder franchise. Whether or not the decision of the shareholders
weakens the staggered board defense, the vote to move the annual meeting
was an informed vote, and from a policy perspective, it is more important
to give effect to the shareholder vote with regards to the means of electing
directors.
In light of the recent decision of the Court of Chancery with regard to
Airgas’s poison pill, the effectiveness of the shareholder franchise is a
critical aspect to hostile takeovers. For, as the court stated in Blasius,
“[t]he shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the
legitimacy of directorial power rests.”167 And yet, when the shareholders
voted to move the meeting at which they exercise their voting rights, the
corporate board of directors effectively vetoed those rights by moving the
courts to enforce an understanding of their corporate charter that was
neither obvious nor shared among the shareholders. In doing so, the board
of directors effectively entrenched themselves, ultimately forcing Air
Products to cease its efforts to acquire the company.168
Although the long-term impact of the Delaware Supreme Court’s
decision cannot be known, it appears that corporations must take especial
care in drafting, and shareholders in understanding, their bylaws. Even
language that seems plain on its face may be considered ambiguous, and
ambiguities may be interpreted based on the practice and custom of other
corporations, rather than the understood principle of favoring the
shareholder franchise.

166. Id.
167. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
168. Air Products ultimately withdrew its bid and has ceased its pursuit of acquiring
Airgas. Steven M. Davidoff, Air Products Bid Dies As Airgas Poison Pill Lives On,
DEALBOOK (Feb. 15, 2011), 2011 WLNR 3004142.

